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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MAIVIIE NUNNELLY et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
LEWIS L. RIGBY et al., 
Appellants, 
vs. 
OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION et al., 
Respondents. 
No. 6657 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS OPPOSING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
On page 3 of their brief in support of the petition for 
rehearing appellants reluctantly bow to this Court's rejec-
tion of their contention that they have a right to elect 
remedies for unnamed stockholders. From that brief it 
would seem that all other comments or rulings adverse to 
them are at best ambiguous and in no event should be taken 
seriously. 
Several contentions made in this case by respondents 
were held to be unsound. With respect to some of them 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
we believe the Court erred. But, like appellants, we had a 
full hearing, followed by a clean-·cut decision. In their 
petition and brief, appellants have done nothing more than 
seek a rehash of matters fully presented, considered and 
decided. All good things, including hearings, should some-
time come to an end. 
ALLEGED AMBIGUITY 
The first ground of the petition really includes the 
other two grounds. If, as there contended, appellants have 
the "right to establish in this suit their several claims," 
it necessarily follows that the court would "retain juris-
diction" to adjudicate those several claims in this suit. If 
such had been the conclusion of this Court, the only sub-
stantial thing sought by and forbidden to appellants would 
have been their proferred election to rescind in behalf o~ 
unnamed persons. 
Throughout the opinion in the Nunnelly case (154 P. 
(2d) 620), the Court stresses·, with no shadow of ambiguity 
and with great clarity, its conclusion that plaintiffs, named 
or unnamed, can join in this suit for one purpose and one 
purpose only, to wit, "the marshaling of the assets. and im-
pounding the fund" (p. 628). Continuing on pages 628-9, 
the Court says : 
"The suit thus has two phases. The first phase 
is to impound the fund, appoint a receiver, etc. For 
this phase the parties may ·all be treated as though 
they still owned their certificates. They may join 
their various claims as though they were still certifi-
cate holders for the purpose of obtaining and holding 
this fund. The second phase will develop only if the 
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fund is impounded and the court is confronted with 
the problem of distributing the fund. At this point 
equity can no longer treat these plaintiffs as though 
they still owned their certificates, for at this point 
the very issue for determination will be whether they 
were defrauded." 
Then follows the statement referred to on page 3 of 
appellants' brief that appellants "cannot join to recover 
damages or to rescind." 
At page 631, after indicating that upon proof of in-
solvency, etc., receivership might be proper (which sug-
gestion would be entirely appropriate even if Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Insurance Corporation were appointed re-
ceiver), the Court says : 
"Each defrauded certificate holder should then 
be given an opportunity to come in and claim the 
benefits of the suit so far as they had accrued and 
an opportunity to present his claim. If the claim 
were rejected by the receiver the usual procedure 
could be followed to determine the validity of the 
claim. The named plaintiffs as well as those not 
named would of course have to present their claims." 
At pages 631-2 the Court continues: 
"If the plaintiffs should be unable to establish 
grounds for preserving, impounding and marshaling 
the assets, so that the first phase of the suit would 
be unsuccessful, the second phase as outlined above 
would never develop. There would be no fund to dis-
tribute and thus no need insofar as this proceeding 
is concerned to determine the respective rights of 
the defrauded certificate holders. Whether the plain-
tiffs (named and unnamed) could wait until after 
this suit failed to commence separate suits without 
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the risk of being successfully met by a plea of the 
statute of limitations we now express no opinion," etc. 
Thus the opinion spells out in primer English what 
appellants and the trial court may and may not do in any 
conceivable contingency. Obviously what appellants seek 
from this Court is not "clarification" but "retraction." 
RE APPELLANTS' REHASH OF REJECTED 
CONTENTIONS 
This Court was more successful than counsel on either 
side in discovering a case lending some support in certain 
aspects to a joinder like that here attempted. In that case 
(Black et al. v. Simpson, 77 S. E. 1023 (S. C.)) two of the 
five judges dissented. In this connection we invite attention 
to a later South Carolina case (Stewart et al. v. Ficken et al., 
149 S. E. 164, cited on page 26 of respondents' original 
brief in the Nunnelly case) which is in harmony with the 
editor's notes and annotation in 114 A. L. R. at pages 1015 
et seq. 
But appellants have now found what they designate as 
a "leading case . . . much in point on the general proposi-
tion," to wit, Colem,an et aL v. Barnes, 5 Allen (Mass.) 374. 
They seem to think that case should induce this Court to 
"clarify" its holding that appellants "cannot join to recover 
damages or to rescind," by permitting them to do either or 
both. A reading of the opinion in the Coleman case discloses 
that, like all other decisions of the Massachusetts courts, 
it is in harmony with the decision of this Court denying the 
claimed right of joinder. Plaintiffs sought recovery of 
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eertain property and the matter came before the court on 
general demurrer. The complaint set forth that plaintiffs 
were the several mvners of different parcels of goods in 
possession of the defendant vvhich defendant's pledgor ob-
tained from plaintiffs by separate and distinct acts of fraud 
and that such sales had all been rescinded by the respective 
plaintiffs on account of said fraudulent acts. N otwithstand-
ing the fraud and already accomplished rescission alleged in 
the complaint and admitted by the general demurrer, the 
Court says: "If the averments in the bill went no further, 
the objection (multifarious) would be insurmountable." 
The court then proceeds to point out that defendant held 
the property by way of pledge to secure payment of one 
entire sum of money; defendant had been innocent of any 
fraud or knowledge thereof, and plaintiffs admitted the 
validity of his lien upon all of the property and in their 
complaint offered to pay the full amount of his claim. In 
this situation, where all of the property was covered by this 
common lien or burden, the court says at page 376: 
"It is a case, therefore, where the property of 
several different persons is subject to a common 
charge or burden. Neither of them can reclaim his 
goods until the whole of it is satisfied and dis-
charged; and yet no one of them ought to pay the 
whole sum which the defendant is entitled to receive 
in discharge of his lien. There is, therefore, no 
complete and adequate remedy at law by which each 
of the plaintiffs can recover his own property with-
out paying a larger sum than is properly chargeable 
on his portion. The only remedy by which the rights 
of all parties interested can be protected is in 
equity," etc. 
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6 
Unable to find a single case which by any plausible 
stretch of logic or interpretation could justify the requested 
"clarification," appellants seek elbowroom for their fancies 
in a maxim of equity. 
RE'T'ENTION OF JURISDICTION 
We repeat what we said in our reply brief in the Good-
liffe case: 
"It is of course elementary that in many situa-
tions a court of equity, having once acquired juris-
diction of a case, will retain it in order to do justice 
between the parties." 
If mere allegation of some matter of equitable cog-
nizance, with or without a prayer for equitable relief, would 
permit numerous plaintiffs with entirely separate and dis-
tinct causes of action to join and litigate all of their several 
controversies in a single suit, a novel innovation in pleading 
and practice would be ushered in. 
A desire for brevity is always laudable, but, in quoting 
a text, it does not violate good practice to add the author's 
express qualification of his text, even though such addition 
may require an additional line or two of printing. At page 
11 of their brief appellants quote from 30 C. J. S. 414 as 
follows: 
"It is a general rule of equitable jurisprudence 
that where the court has assumed jurisdiction for 
one purpose it will retain it for all purposes, legal 
or equitable, connected with the principal contro-
versy;" , 
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The quoted excerpt ends with a semicolon, not a period, 
and is immediately followed by the qualification: 
"but the rule is permissive rather than peremptory, 
and will not be applied so as to defeat the funda-
mental rights of litigants or to violate the basic doc-
trines of pleading; and it may not be invoked where 
no ground of equitable jurisdiction has first been 
asserted and established, nor in violation of contrary 
statutes." 
On the same page the author also stresses the rule that 
questions determined must be "incidental to the main con-
troversy" and that any relief granted must be "incidental 
to the accomplishment of the principal object of the bill." 
Appellants strenuously and frequently urged in earlier briefs 
and upon the oral arguments that the marshaling and im-
pounding of assets, appointment of receiver, etc., are reme-
dies ancillary to their causes of action arising out of the 
alleged conspiracy and frauds. Obviously those causes of 
action are neither ancillary nor incidental to any of the 
reliefs sought. 
The "nine columns of cases" referred to on page 11 of 
appellants' brief support the text under which they are 
cited. Neither they nor any other case or text imply or 
support a contention that by incorporating in a complaint 
some matter of equitable cognizance rules of pleading fly 
out the window and improper joinders become immaterial. 
Obviously a court of equity may retain jurisdiction and 
proceed to grant relief with respect to those matters only 
which are properly included in the bill. 
If, as stated in above quoted text, the rule permitting 
a court of equity retaining jurisdiction for one purpose to 
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retain it for all purposes. will not be applied so as "to 
violate the basic doctrines of pleading," it would seem 
improper to apply it in clear violation of the mandate of 
Section 104-7-3, U. C. A. 1943. As pointed out in the orig-
inal briefs, that statute expressly applies to a joinder of 
causes of action "legal or equitable or both" and, except 
in foreclosure suits, permits such joinder only where the 
causes of action so united "all belong to one" of the desig-
nated classes. and "affect all the parties to the action." 
(See pages 9-21 of respondents' brief in the Nhnnelly case.) 
At page 9 of their brief, appellants refer to the Brenner 
case, 114 A. L. R. 1010, as one "so strongly relied on by 
respondent" Associations. The fact that we have never 
before even cited the case is not permitted to cramp appel-
lants' style. On said page 9 they say the Brenner case 
"is not remotely in point for the Colonial Corporation" but 
holds that "the several plaintiffs could be properly joined 
even at law." In their analysis of the case do appellants 
act on the assumption that this. Court has not read or will 
not read the opinion of the New York court? Why did 
appellants refrain from pointing out that the sole reason 
why Brenner et al. might have joined in an action at law 
was the existence of a recent New York statute (so far 
as we are aware the only one of its kind) expressly per-
mitting such joinder? At page 1014 the court specifically 
identifies the basis of its observation that plaintiffs there 
might have joined in a suit at law by pointing out that the 
New York legislature "has adopted a new and very broad 
provision for the 'joinder of plaintiffs generally' in whom 
any right to relief is alleged to exist, 'whether jointly,. 
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severally or in the alternative.' " Notwithstanding this 
statute, the court refused to permit joinder of plaintiffs 
in a representative suit, such joinder not being permissible 
under another and earlier statute. At page 1014 the court 
thus aptly states why the n1andate of Utah statutes relative 
to joinder may not be ignored: 
"The courts may not disregard a limitation which 
the legislature has not destroyed even if there were 
no sound basis for retaining in the statute the old 
distinction." 
Appellants further say on page 9 that in the Brenner 
case "and note thereto" there was no "element of common 
and (or) insufficient funds or the necessity of injunction, 
marshaling or accounting" as in the cases at bar. The only 
accurate portion of that statement is that such elements did 
not happen to be present in the Brenner case. That the state-
ment may have been made without reading the text or cases 
contained in the note would probably not serve as a good 
excuse. The Spear and Brown cases next below cited are 
among those referred to by the editor in support of his 
text. 
Spear v. Greene Co., 140 N. E. 795 (Mass.), is cited 
and discussed at length on pages 1017-1018 of the note and 
cited on page 26 of our brief in the Nunnelly case. This was 
a suit in equity wherein impairment of corporate defend-
ant's capital was alleged and plaintiffs sought rescission 
for fraud and conspiracy, establishment of a trust upon the 
proceeds of the frauds for the benefit of all stockholders, 
an accounting, appointment of a receiver, and a pro rata 
distribution of assets, and other reliefs. 
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Brown v. Werblin et al., 244 N.Y. S. 209, is cited and 
analyzed on page 1021 of the note and cited and discussed 
on pages 16-17 of our brief in the Nunnelly case. The cause 
of action was based on allegations of fraud and conspiracy 
with respect to stock sales, creation of a fictitious market, 
etc., very similar to those in appellants.' complaint. It was 
alleged that the fraudulent profits constituted a trust fund, 
and among the reliefs sought was an injunction requiring 
the impounding of such profits, that they be impressed with 
with a lien in favor of plaintiffs, etc. 
A $Teat number of the decided cases where two or more 
plaintiffs sought to prosecute their separate and distinct 
causes of action in a single suit involved one or all of the 
elements of insolvency, trust fund, marshaling and prorat-
ing of assets, and demand for a receiver. Uniformly the 
presence of any or all of these elements has been held in-
sufficient to permit plaintiffs to join and prosecute in a 
single suit separate and distinct causes of action each of 
which being of concern to one plaintiff only. Among the 
many cases. cited in our original briefs where one or more 
or said elements was present and joinder denied are the 
following: 
Ballew Lumber & Hardware Co. et al. v. M.P. 
Ry. Co. et al., 232 S. W. 1015 (Mo.), cited on page 
26 of our Nunnelly brief. Fraudulent conveyance 
to insolvent defendant Railroad Company was al-
leged by creditors who sought an accounting, the 
establishment of and recourse to a trust fund and 
appointment of a receiver. 
Rural Credit Subscribers Ass'n v. J ett, 266 S. W. 
240 (Ky.), cited on page 26 of Nunnelly brief. In-
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junction and payment of the fund to trustee and 
prorating thereof were sought. 
Lile et al. v. Kefa.uver et al., 51 S. W. (2d) 
473 (Ky.), cited on pages 15 and 26 of our Nunnelly 
brief. Insolvency and necessity of prorating claims 
were elements. 
We frankly confess our inability to understand appel-
lants' observations relative to intervention appearing on 
pages 4 and 5 of their brief. If their thought is that the 
opinion suggests or should suggest that unnamed plaintiffs 
may intervene in this suit for any other purpose than "the 
marshaling of the assets and impounding the fund" or that 
named plaintiffs may join for any other purpose, we find 
no basis in the opinion for such surmise. 
We believe we have mentioned every point raised by 
appellants' brief except their contention that because Sec-
tion 88-2-12, U. C. A., 1943, provides that the "singular 
number includes the plural, and the plural the singular" it 
necessarily follows that the provision of our Uniform Fraud-
ulent Conveyance Act permitting "a creditor" to proceed 
against the grantee of a fraudulent conveyance repeals or 
otherwise nullifies the Utah statute relative to joinder and 
permits any and every creditor to not only join in preserving 
the res but under one complaint in a single suit to have their 
separate and distinct causes of action adjudicated. Thus 
liability to one of a hundred creditors for assault and battery, 
to another on a promissory note, to another for a grocery 
bill or personal injuries, etc., might all be alleged in one 
complaint and adjudicated in one suit. By the same reason-
ing, under our death by wrongful act statute, Section 104-
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3-11, U. C. A. 1943, all heirs or personal representatives 
of all persons ("persons" because the words "a person" 
employed in the statute includes the plural) might unite in 
one suit against the wrongdoer. Indeed the same reasoning 
and statutory construction would permit a joinder as de-
fendants in one suit of all persons whose wrongful acts 
have resulted in death, even though the respective deaths 
(like the alleged frauds here complained of) may have 
occurred at entirely different times and places. Appellants' 
rule of statutory construction would necessarily permit a 
single suit against all persons responsible for the deaths 
of all decedents because the language of the statute permit-
ting suit against "the person causing the death" include~ 
the plural and authorizes such suit against all persons caus-
ing deaths. Thus the plaintiffs in all pending suits for death 
by wrongful ,act against railroads and other corporations 
and persons, might properly have joined in one complaint 
and litigated all of their claims in one suit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STUART P. DOBBS, 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE, 
P. T. FARNSWORTH, JR., 
Attorneys for Respondents for whom 
they have heretofore appeared. 
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